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Representations and visualisation in teaching and learning chemistry 
[This is an editorial, so there is no abstract]

The 2019 special issue of Chemistry Education Research and Practice has been announced and 
will have the theme ‘Visualisations and representations in chemistry education’. The call from the 
theme guest editors, Resa Kelly and Sevil Akaygün, for submissions to be considered for the 
theme is available on the journal’s blog ( http://blogs.rsc.org/rp/2018/02/23/visualisations-and-
representations-in-chemistry-education/ ). This is both an especially interesting topic in chemistry 
education, and one of considerable importance to the practice of chemistry teaching. 

Representation may be understood as one thing standing for another and this is especially 
important in teaching where the teacher often seeks to make the unfamiliar familiar. Sometimes 
we do not need to represent - as we make the unfamiliar familiar directly through immediate 
experience. As one example, students are sometimes expected to learn about flame tests - that 
is, identifying the presence of certain element in compounds by heating small samples in a flame. 
Certain elements, sodium, copper, potassium, among others, give ‘characteristic’ flame colours. It 
does not make sense to teach about this by representing the colours when it is possible to 
actually present the colours directly by showing students the flames. If a student is to to 
appreciate what is meant by a flame being described as lilac or brick red, then clearly actually 
seeing the colours (to which these labels have become associated) produced in the flame test is 
superior to a photograph reproduced in a book, and - even more so - than simply a verbal 
description. Indeed, we would normally want students to not only see, but carry out, the tests - as 
science is a practice, not just a body of knowledge; as learning tends to be more eﬀective when 
multimodal; and as much of the knowledge of laboratory work is tacit in nature (Polanyi, 1962) - 
vicarious experience is never a perfect substitute for personal experience.

The nature of concepts and conceptual learning 
Yet much that is taught and learnt in schools and colleges cannot be directly demonstrated so 
readily. In particular, so called ‘academic’ subjects, such as chemistry, have as a stock-in-trade a 
store of conceptual knowledge that they seek to make available to learners. Concepts are 
abstractions, and can act as categories. So a person who has acquired concepts of, say metal, 
liquid, and flask, could apply those concepts to making discriminations as part of organising and 
structuring their experience. William James famously pointed out that a newborn is faced with a 
blooming, buzzing confusion - their perceptual experience largely comprises patches of 
illumination, in diﬀerent colours and shapes; and noises of diﬀerent pitch, loudness, and duration; 
and so forth. Somehow that neonate has to develop into a sophisticated organiser and 
discriminator of their environment in order to survive in it. In time they can perceive objects rather 
than noises and patches of colour and so act in the environment - such as when they want to 
cross a road. Of course interpreting the environment in order to safely cross the road involves 
more than conceptualising (the pavement, the road, the vehicles, etc.) but also a degree of 
theorising. The person often has to draw inferences about other people’s motives and likely 
behaviour. Each time we assume that it is safe to cross because we can reach the other side at a 
reasonable walking speed before approaching vehicles get to our position we are (usually without 
being aware) making assumptions that cannot be certain. We often cross a road in a situation 
where a visible car could easily accelerate suﬃciently to collide with us before we get across (or 
where one that has just passed by could potentially make a U-turn and hit us), but even when that 
is physically feasible we apply what we know about normal behaviour and typical human 
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psychology to evaluate that this is unlikely to happen (despite such pathological behaviour being 
over-represented in some genres of drama). 

This is analogous to how scientists use concepts. Popper (1934/1959) argued that induction (the 
process by which we can draw general conclusions about classes - e.g., copper is an electrical 
conductor - from a ‘suﬃcient’ sampling of observations) was not sound as a logical basis for 
knowledge. We can not assume a particular copper wire will conduct electricity because 
scientists have already tested all copper wires that exist (or will exist), in order to check their 
conductivity. That clearly is not so. Nor should we conclude by induction that this copper wire will 
conduct, because scientists have sampled quite an array of cooper wires, and so far they all been 
found to conduct. In practice, that is how many of us do think much of the time, but such an 
inference is not logically certain. Rather, from a scientific perspective, we can assume that the 
next copper wire we encounter will conduct because is it made of copper, and we have theories 
of the structure of copper and of the nature of conductivity which allow us to deduce (providing 
our theories are sound) the properties of some copper wire that neither we nor any other scientist 
has previously tested. This is a logical deduction, and so depends upon the truth of the 
assumptions being made (that is, how good the theory is). 

The metaphorical nature of human cognition 
It has been suggested that our concepts are directly or indirectly based on abstraction from direct 
experience of the world (Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1980). That is, we form a set of concepts that link 
directly to perception by abstracting from events or objects that are perceived as somehow 
similar to each other. Then we use these concepts grounded in direct experience (such as hot, 
big, top, left, inside, underneath, etc) metaphorically to build more abstract notions: the hot date, 
the big boss, the top athlete, the left-field idea, the inner circle, and so forth. The hot date could 
take place in a sauna, and the big boss might be obese, but we know that is not what such terms 
are intended to convey. We do not all independently invent such second order concepts, rather 
their usage becomes common practice through sharing; but often when we meet a new term of 
this kind we appreciate the metaphor. 

So when a colleague tells you that they recently got their fingers burnt, you probably do not 
expect this to be meant literally (at least, not unless you already consider them to be irresponsible 
when it comes to laboratory risk assessment). Using a term like this as a metaphor to 
communicate an idea relies upon people having direct experience of fingers and burns, but also 
access to a repertoire of nuanced social/economic experiences that they can reflect on. To know 
what someone means by this term one has to be able to relate it to situations (experienced, or 
capable of being imaged based on actual experiences) that are in a sense like having got one’s 
finger’s burned: that is when getting too close (metaphorically) to a (metaphorically) hot situation.

In the first half of the last century Lev Vygotsky discussed two sources of our conceptual 
knowledge (Vygotsky, 1934/1994). Spontaneous concepts are the abstractions we make from 
everyday experience. Scientific (or academic) concepts are those that are acquired through formal 
teaching. One of Vygotsky’s great insights was to realise how these these two systems interacted 
in conceptual development. Spontaneous concepts can be directly, indeed automatically, applied, 
but are not suitable for use in sophisticated thinking. Academic concepts are represented through 
formal symbol systems (language being the most obvious) and can potentially remain ‘rote’ 
learning. Vygotsky used a metaphor of these two types of concepts growing towards each other. 
Formal instruction provides a language with definitions and the like that can allow spontaneous 
concepts to move from the intuitive level so that they can be used in deliberation, conversation, 
and discourse in general - so they become open to analytical critique for example. Spontaneous 
concepts provide the grounding for making sense of formal academic concepts. A formal 
definition of combustion can only be understood by relating it to direct experience of phenomena: 
and an implicit concept of fire or burning abstracted from direct experience can be theorised in 
terms of the taught formal concept. In eﬀect our functional concepts are neither one kind or the 
other, but melded concepts that develop from the interplay of spontaneous and academic 
concepts (Taber, 2013).
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Representing concepts 
Language is one of the key representational systems used in teaching, and indeed in much 
human activity. It has a key role when teaching canonical concepts, even those that relate directly 
to phenomena we can demonstrate. So combustion is a theoretical concept that can be 
understood to encompass a variety of actual experienced events - but if we want diﬀerent 
students to develop the same theoretical understanding we rely on shortcutting the historical 
development of the concept (which in any case will be contingent - so it cannot be assumed that 
re-running history would lead to the same set of concepts understood in precisely the same way) 
and guide learners towards the canonical understanding that has developed. 
1
We can also use language to ‘share’ concepts which have less potential for direct abstraction 
from experience - examples (and in chemistry there are a great many) might be resonance, d-level 
splitting, ideal gas, homolytic fission, or transition state, where what can actually be directly 
experienced is unlikely to be abstracted into the formal concept without considerable mediation. 
Even in a case like neutralisation, where it is relatively easy for students to have close experience 
with many examples of the class of reaction, the argument used to abstract these examples under 
a common concept is theoretical, and/or instrumental (indicators, pH meters, etc.), and not based 
on what can be directly perceived. Often our concepts in chemistry do not relate to phenomena 
(directly observed events) in themselves, but rather these are seen as signs of something not 
directly observable. So the explanandum that act as phenomena are often the inscriptions 
produced by complex apparatus (such as a Fourier n.m.r. spectrum) that are taken to indicate 
some aspect of nature that can be usefully conceptualised (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Here both 
instrumentation and the explanations of a more knowledgable other are involved in mediating the 
acquisition of the formal concept. For example, the teacher not only has to explain the concept of 
hydrogen bonding but also why a certain reading on a thermometer or the particular details of a 
peak on a spectrum provide something that needs to be explained with the help of this concept. 

Chemistry has many important concepts that are primary about, or at least primarily or partially 
understood in terms of, entities that are not accessible to direct experience: molecules, ions, 
electrons, orbitals, and so forth (Johnstone, 1982). Here students learn about a world of 
theoretical entities at a scale far from their direct experience. It should not be surprising that we 
find common learning diﬃculties such as confusing the explanandum and explanans (e.g., copper 
conducts because it is made up of copper atoms which conduct) and teachers oﬀering to make 
the unfamiliar familiar by calling upon human motivations (as when atoms are said to want to 
achieve full electron shells). A little thought shows just what an achievement it is when there is 
some kind of alignment in how learners conceptualise chemistry compared to how their teachers 
were intending.

The notion of sharing our concepts is itself metaphorical. We share divisible objects. We can share 
a bag of peanuts by having some each. If the teacher shares peanuts with her class she then has 
less peanuts herself. If the teacher shares her concepts, then something rather diﬀerent is going 
on. Teaching was once commonly thought of in terms less of sharing than of copying - copying 
ideas from the teacher to the learners (although the common metaphor of the transmission of 
knowledge might imply translocation rather than replication), but we know of no mechanism that 
allows ideas to be directly copied. Rather learners have to construct their own understandings, 
which under skilled guidance will hopefully become suﬃciently similar to that intended to allow 
meaningful communication and some level of engagement in the practices of the discipline. All of 
this depends upon teaches being able to represent their thinking in ways that students can 
interpret.

Representational systems used in chemistry 
Learning chemistry does not only rely on a reasonable competence in a language such as English.  
Chemistry also draws on a wide range of other symbolic representations (Taber, 2009). Intimately 
linked to the theoretical structure of the subject is the system of chemical symbols and equations 
that can be used to summarise, posit, explore, quantify, etc., real or conjectured chemical 
reactions. This system also has the useful ambiguity of often potentially standing at the same time 
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for something at the bench (macroscopic, observable) level and something at the submicroscopic 
(theoretical models of matter many order of magnitude smaller) level. Other special forms of 
symbols are used to reflect compound structure and reaction mechanisms in organic chemistry. 
As a science, chemistry uses general forms of graphical representation common in many 
subjects, but sometimes with discipline-specific features (such as the common representation of 
reaction profiles). It also has its particular representations, such as the periodic table which 
summarises a great deal of chemical knowledge - for those who can interpret it. 

Non-verbal forms of representation are extremely valuable in teaching and learning, not simply 
because ‘a picture can paint a thousand words’ (i.e., that sometimes an image can succinctly 
represent what would require a long verbal description) but also because the human cognitive 
architecture tends to use imagery and words as complementary - so working memory is 
considered to have distinct buﬀers for visual and verbal information for example (Baddeley, 2003). 
Much imaginative thinking is visual in nature, and this is considered to have made major 
contributions to scientific work (Miller, 1986). 

Aﬀordances of technology 
Once classroom use of these non-verbal forms of representation were limited by what could be 
achieved in a printed book page or by what a teacher might draw on the board - perhaps 
supplemented by some gestural hand-waving (Kress, Jewitt, Ogborn, & Tsatsarelis, 2001). 
However improvements in educational technology mean that many previous restrictions no longer 
apply. Animations, stop motion video, computer generated simulations, virtual reality - are all 
becoming increasingly widely available. 

This oﬀers many advantages. Images can be much more sophisticated. They can be generated to 
illustrate what could be seen from diﬀerent angles and at diﬀerent scales. Not only is shifting scale 
or changing perspective possible, but so is following the progression of a system over time. This 
is important in that the scientific imagination often works by forming a mental model that evolves 
over time, and this process can now be represented in what seems a continuous flow of action. 
This raises areas of research interest (Gilbert, 2005) - for example exploring people’s (scientists, 
learners’) actual mental visualisations and simulations; and developing tools to support students’ 
in forming productive visualisations of chemical entities and systems.  

It is also easy with modern technology to present alternatives. A long-standing problem in science 
education is the tendency for many learners to assume that the models they meet are meant to be 
realistic representations of aspects of nature. That may sometimes be so (although if it is a model, 
it will have some diﬀerences, and in particular simplifications), but by no means always. There is a 
range of models of the atom which can be useful to the chemistry learner - but when they meet 
diﬀerent, and apparently incongruent, models of the ‘same’ target in diﬀerent contexts this can 
give the impression that we are free to tweak our models arbitrarily (that is, regardless of the 
strength of empirical backing) as needs arise. At a click of a button a teacher can present a range 
of relevant alternatives (of models, or of diﬀerent representations based on the same model) and 
explore the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives. This may be especially valuable 
in situations where there is no single representation that is unambiguously preferred - but can also 
be used as a basis for discussion in those topics where learners commonly reproduce canonical 
versions incorrectly. 

Learners are doing it for themselves 
Another important theme here is shifting the role of the learner from being just a receiver and 
interpreter of representations, to being a generator of representations (Tytler, Prain, Hubber, & 
Waldrip, 2013). Clearly, given how canonical learning depends upon on appropriate mediation by 
the teacher who guides the learners’ constructions of knowledge, learners are unlikely to 
spontaneously re-invent the canonical representations of a discipline. Those students who 
suggest that the benzene molecule has a kind of electron reservoir in the centre of the ring, 
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because that’s how they interpret the symbolism of the circle drawn within a hexagon in the 
symbol commonly used to denote an aromatic ring, would be unlikely to invent the canonical 
symbol. For them, the circle inside the hexagon is read more iconically than symbolically, and 
represents a container inside the sigma framework of the ring. 

It would clearly not make sense to set learners the tasks of making up their own symbols to use in 
class to denote standard conditions, enthalpy change, electrode potential, radicals, and the rest. 
Students can get confused enough when we try to get them to all work with the same set of 
symbols and formalisms. However there are some good arguments for engaging in such activities, 
at least some of the time. Developing representations is an important part of scientific work. All 
those canonical systems and conventions we use, both those that can seem fairly arbitrary, and 
those where there is some kind of iconic logic - as when drawing open vessels such as conical 
flasks and test tubes cross-sectionally to show where materials may be added or removed - were 
creations of human imagination. Education in the sciences tends to focus heavily on the logical 
thinking required to do science, but usually puts much less emphasis on the equally important 
role of imagination (Taber, 2011). In some countries this is especially so at school level, where 
learners are given little reason to consider science as a creative activity. Getting students to 
occasionally develop their own representations can give them a flavour of this aspect of the 
scientific enterprise, and may engage some students who normally prefer other areas of the 
curriculum.

This is not to suggest that we stop teaching science and have a brief creative interlude as a form 
of light relief in our classes - far from it. The imaginative work of the scientist needs to married to 
the critical nature of scientific work. This can be an opportunity to employ a dialogic approach 
(Mortimer & Scott, 2003). Students can be asked to develop their own representation, and then 
compare with another student, and to explain their ideas to each other. The pair could decide 
which representation to take forward, or build some kind of hybrid. The process could be 
repeated by getting pairs into groups who discuss, argue, and bring forward a suggestion. The 
teacher can elicit group suggestions, and lead a class discussion on the diﬀerent ideas. Then the 
canonical version can be introduced and students invited to comment on its strengths and 
limitations. This teaches something about the nature of representation, and the argumentation 
processes by which science encompasses the development, refinement, and selection, of 
conventions of representation, as well as hopefully getting learners to think about the canonical 
representations in more depth than when they are simply presented as a matter of fiat.

A teacher who is concerned that they might get their fingers burnt by risking students generating 
alternative representations that will not get credit in examinations might restrict the activity to 
representations lacking such oﬃcial status. For example, students could be given outline periodic 
tables (perhaps showing element symbols and atomic numbers only) and asked to suggest 
helpful ways of visually representing key properties or trends. Even this brief discussion suggests 
there is great potential for work relating to representation and visualisation to be of interest to 
readers and inform chemistry education practices. This is clearly an exciting theme for a special 
issue, and the editorial team join the guest editors, Resa Kelly and Sevil Akaygün, in inviting 
contributions for consideration for the theme of ‘Visualisations and representations in chemistry 
education’.
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 Some readers may note that this seems to imply a relativistic notion of science, such that 1
diﬀerent cultures develop diﬀerent science and, as Kuhn (1970) pointed out, there is no 
independent standpoint from which to choose between them as any ‘judge’ would be encultured 
in one tradition or another. However, even if we see science as in principle progressive, that is in 
building accounts of the world that are incrementally closer to how nature actually is, diﬀerent 
historical ‘runs’ are likely to take diﬀerent routes even if we expect them to ultimately converge on 
the same accounts.
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